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SUMMARY
•	 For	the	last	two	decades,	oligarchs,	or	big	entrepreneurs	who	
have	 been	 able	 to	 turn	 their	 business	 prowess	 into	 power-
ful	political	 influence,	have	been	among	the	most	 important	
actors	 in	 Ukraine’s	 politics.	 More	 than	 two	 years	 after	 the	
Maidan	revolution,	 it	 is	 fully	 justified	 to	say	 that	 the	oligar-
chic	system	remains	a	key	mechanism	in	Ukraine’s	political	
and	economic	life.	While	it	is	true	that	the	influence	of	the	for-
merly	most	powerful	oligarchic	groups	has	eroded	during	this	
period,	no	such	group	except	for	the	Family,	i.e.	the	oligarchic	
circle	centred	around	former	President	Yanukovych,	has	been	
eliminated.	
•	 The	 oligarchs	 have	 been	 able	 to	 hold	 on	 to	 their	 influence	
in	 politics	 and	 the	 economy	 thanks	 to	 a	 number	 of	 factors,	
among	which	 two	are	particularly	 important:	 the	weakness	
of	the	government	in	Kyiv,	which	is	preoccupied	with	the	war	
in	defence	of	 the	 country’s	 territorial	 integrity,	 and	 the	 fact	
that	the	oligarchic	groups	still	possess	powerful	instruments	
to	defend	 their	positions,	 including	dominance	of	 the	media	
market	and	some	strategic	sectors	of	the	economy.	However,	
the	main	cause	behind	the	persistence	of	 the	oligarchic	sys-
tem	has	been	the	decision,	taken	by	some	of	the	post-Maidan	
elite,	to	enter	into	informal	alliances	with	the	oligarchs.	Presi-
dent	Petro	Poroshenko’s	group	and	the	circle	of	the	then	prime	
minister	Arseniy	Yatsenyuk	and	his	People’s	Front	party	have	
–	independently	of	each	other	–	entered	informal	agreements	
with	different	oligarchic	groups.	This	has	led	to	the	creation	
of	an	important	division	in	Ukrainian	politics.	That	division	
persists	despite	 the	 fact	 that	Volodymyr	Groysman,	 the	new	
prime	minister	 appointed	 in	mid-April	 2016,	has	 close	 links	
to	 the	 president’s	 camp.	 However,	 this	 is	 a	 purely	 tactical	
and	 therefore	 impermanent	alignment,	 founded	on	 the	cur-
rent	needs	of	the	two	sides.	The	lesson	from	the	last	dozen	or	
so	years	 in	Ukraine	 is	 that	 the	oligarchs	do	not	 enter	 stable	
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alliances,	and	are	flexible	in	choosing	their	allies.	Their	rela-
tions	with	one	political	party	or	another	depend	on	the	cur-
rent	political	situation,	and	are	subordinated	to	the	overarch-
ing	objective	of	preserving	their	business	interests.
•	 As	the	‘old’	oligarchs	have	preserved	much	of	their	influence,	
in	 parallel,	 new	 political-business	 groups	 have	 started	 to	
emerge	around	 the	Ukrainian	 leadership,	which	can	also	be	
termed	‘oligarchic’.	Thanks	to	their	close	links	to	the	highest-
ranking	 leaders	 of	 Ukraine,	 members	 of	 these	 groups	 have	
taken	 control	 over	many	 important	 state-owned	 companies	
and	 have	 been	 trying	 to	 build	 up	 their	 own	 financial	 and	
business	bases.	Their	efforts	have	been	motivated	by	a	deep-
rooted,	if	informal,	principle	of	Ukrainian	politics,	according	
to	which	political	power	also	depends	on	the	value	of	the	busi-
ness	 assets	 controlled	 by	 any	 given	 party.	 This	 mechanism	
has	 been	 practically	 identical	 to	what	was	 observed	 during	
Viktor	Yanukovych’s	rule,	although	its	scale	is	smaller,	and	it	
has	been	operating	in	the	conditions	of	a	deep	economic	crisis,	
with	fewer	assets	up	for	grabs.	The	main	resource	of	the	new-
ly	emerging	oligarchic	groups	consists	in	their	close	relations	
with	the	high-ranking	leaders	of	Ukraine,	and	not	in	perma-
nent	 control	 (ownership)	 of	 important	 enterprises	 or	media	
companies.	As	a	result,	these	groups	are	still	weaker	than	the	
‘old’	oligarchs	and	–	in	view	of	the	chronic	political	instability	
in	Ukraine	–	unlikely	to	consolidate	their	influence.
•	 The	existence	of	 the	oligarchic	groups,	 formed	as	a	result	of	
a	pathological	symbiosis	between	power	and	big	business,	re-
mains	one	of	 the	crucial	obstacles	 impeding	 the	modernisa-
tion	of	 the	Ukrainian	state.	The	reforms	implemented	so	far	
have	been	inconsistent	and	too	slow,	and	have	not	undermined	
the	oligarchs’	position,	one	reason	for	which	is	that	both	the	
‘old’	and	 ‘new’	oligarchs	have	proven	skilful	 in	hindering	or	
delaying	the	reform	process.	In	a	country	as	weak	as	Ukraine,	
well-organised	 oligarchic	 groups	with	 their	 own	media	 and	
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substantial	financial	resources	are	still	seen	by	politicians	as	
desirable	allies,	and	as	a	result	they	have	become	a	permanent	
element	of	politics.	The	oligarchs	are	there	because	of	the	ab-
sence	 of	 strong	 state	 institutions,	which,	 in	 turn,	 should	 be	
blamed	on	the	weakness	of	a	state	ridden	by	systemic	corrup-
tion	and	lacking	an	independent	judiciary	or	efficient	admin-
istration.	Thus,	the	oligarchs	have	been	the	beneficiaries	of	all	
the	 shortcomings	of	 the	Ukrainian	state.	The	 success	of	 any	
efforts	 to	 undermine	 their	 influence	 will	 depend	 primarily	
on	whether	Ukraine’s	present-day	façade	 institutions	can	be	
replaced	with	institutions	that	are	robust	and	independent	–	
and	that	is	the	most	important	objective	of	the	reform	process.
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INTRODUCTION
The	Ukrainian	oligarchic	system	which	formed	in	the	second	half	
of	 the	 1990s	has	demonstrated	 extraordinary	vitality	 and	 resil-
ience,	as	well	as	a	capacity	to	adapt	to	changing	political	circum-
stances.	 Irrespective	 of	 who	 is	 in	 power	 in	 Kyiv,	 the	 oligarchs	
invariably	retain	their	status	as	key	political	players.	In	no	oth-
er	country	 in	Europe	 (except	 for	Moldova1)	do	oligarchs	hold	as	
much	sway	as	in	Ukraine.	The	purpose	of	the	present	paper	is	to	
describe	the	role	and	significance	of	the	oligarchs	in	Ukraine	two	
and	a	half	years	after	the	Maidan.
Oligarchy	is	not	an	exclusively	Ukrainian	or	post-Soviet	phenom-
enon	–	it	has	been	known	since	the	times	of	the	first	state	organ-
isms	and	political	systems.	Some	characteristics	of	oligarchy	are	
constant,	 whether	 it	 is	 the	 ancient	 world,	 certain	 modern-era	
Western	European	states,	the	Polish-Lithuanian	Commonwealth,	
or	 Ukraine	 since	 1991.	 According	 to	 Professor	 Antoni	 Mączak,	
a	 distinguished	 Polish	 historian	who	 studied	 the	 phenomenon,	
oligarchy	is	primarily	a	system	of	state	governance.2	In	an	oligar-
chic	system,	an	informal	and	limited	group	(or	groups)	operates	
whose	members,	 the	 oligarchs,	 have	 created	networks	 of	 inter-
dependencies.	 Within	 those	 networks,	 they	 provide	 patronage	
and	 protection	 to	 their	 clients	 (politicians,	 communities,	 par-
ties,	etc.)	in	return	for	loyalty	and	for	promoting	their	interests.	
As	 a	 result,	 whole	 pyramids	 of	 interdependencies	 form	within	
a	state	(at	both	the	central	and	the	local	 levels),	which	resemble	
1	 K.	Całus,	Moldova:	 from	oligarchic	pluralism	 to	Plahotniuc’s	hegemony,	
OSW Commentary,	 11	 April	 2016,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-commentary/2016-04-11/moldova-oligarchic-pluralism-to-plahotniucs-
hegemony
2	 Professor	Antoni	Mączak’s	two	major	works	on	oligarchy	as	a	system	of	pow-
er	are	Klientela. Nieformalne systemy władzy w Polsce i w Europie XVI-XVIII w.	
[Clientele.	Informal	systems	of	power	in	Poland	and	in	Europe	in	the	16th	to	
18th	century],	Warsaw	2000,	and	Nierówna przyjaźń: układy klientalne w pers-
pektywie historycznej	[Unequal	friendship:	clientelist	systems	in	a	historical	
perspective],	Wrocław	2003.
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feudal	relationships.	The	historical	models	described	by	Profes-
sor	Mączak	may	be	helpful	today	in	understanding	the	oligarchic	
systems	in	Ukraine.
It	appears	that	the	negative	phenomenon	of	Ukrainian	oligarchy	
has	not	been	fully	recognised	in	the	West,	and	has	therefore	been	
ignored	and	remains	poorly	studied.3	This	may	be	due	to	difficulty	
in	 capturing	 and	 describing	 the	 phenomenon,	 which	 combines	
political	 as	well	 strictly	economic	and	financial	 elements.	A	 re-
searcher	studying	oligarchy	 is	often	 forced	 to	rely	on	presump-
tions	 rather	 than	hard	 facts.	However,	without	unravelling	 the	
behind-the-scenes	workings	 of	 the	 oligarchy,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	
understand	the	real	mechanisms	at	work	in	Ukrainian	politics.
The	purpose	of	the	present	paper	is	not	to	comprehensively	ana-
lyse	the	Ukrainian	oligarchic	system,	but	rather	to	show	how	and	
why	 the	oligarchs	have	been	able	 to	preserve	 their	 role	 and	 in-
fluence	in	the	wake	of	the	Revolution	of	Dignity.	The	first	part	is	
focused	on	the	situation	of	the	oligarchic	groups	that	have	existed	
for	a	dozen	or	so	years,	which	we	will	refer	to	as	the	‘old’	oligar-
chic	groups	for	the	sake	of	simplicity.	It	explains	how	these	groups	
have	established	co-operation	with	 the	post-Maidan	 leadership,	
which	was	one	of	the	reasons	they	preserved	their	political	and	
economic	positions.	The	 second	part	describes	 the	parallel	 pro-
cess	started	in	2014,	whereby	people	from	the	Ukrainian	top	lead-
ership’s	inner	circle	have	been	building	their	own	business	bases.	
Their	mode	of	operation,	which	mainly	consists	in	taking	control	
over	state-owned	companies	in	their	own	or	their	parties’	inter-
ests,	 resembles	 the	methods	employed	 in	 the	past,	proving	 that	
the	pathological	mechanisms	 in	Ukrainian	politics	are	 far	 from	
having	been	eradicated.	The	beneficiaries	of	this	process	will	be	
referred	to	as	 ‘new	oligarchs’	 in	the	text,	which	 is	only	a	minor	
simplification.
3	 This	is	evidenced	by	the	fact	that	not	a	single	book	has	been	published	in	
English	on	the	Ukrainian	oligarchic	system.	
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In	 the	conclusion,	 this	paper	will	 try	 to	answer	 the	question	of	
why	de-oligarchisation,	which	has	been	called	for	and	promised	
on	many	occasions,	has	not	happened	in	Ukraine.	The	author’s	ob-
servations,	 especially	about	 the	persistently	 strong	 influence	of	
oligarchic	groups	in	Ukraine,	lead	to	the	conclusion	that	the	effec-
tiveness	of	Ukraine’s	reforms	depends	on	the	future	of	Ukrainian	
oligarchy.
In	the	title	of	this	paper	the	oligarchs	are	referred	to	as	the	‘cor-
nerstone’,	 in	order	to	emphasise	that	they	are	the	strongest	ele-
ment	in	the	dysfunctional	system	that	has	formed	in	Ukraine	over	
the	last	two	decades,	and	therefore	one	of	the	most	important	ob-
stacles	hindering	Ukraine’s	efforts	to	exit	the	post-Soviet	model.	
Unless	this	problem	is	solved,	Ukraine	will	not	be	able	to	build	an	
efficient	state	with	well-functioning	market	mechanisms.
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I. OlIgARChS IN The SYSTeM Of pOST-MAIDAN 
UkRAINe
1. The ‘old’ oligarchs (temporarily) on the defensive 
Before	 the	 Revolution	 of	 Dignity,	 there	were	 four	major	 oligar-
chic	groups	and	over	a	dozen	smaller	groupings	in	Ukraine.	They	
never	constituted	a	monolith,	had	contradictory	 interests,	often	
got	conflicted	and	backed	different	political	parties.	This	was	one	
of	 the	key	mechanisms	safeguarding	 the	 specifically	Ukrainian	
type	of	political	pluralism.4	The	most	important	oligarchic	struc-
tures	prior	to	2014	included:
•	 the so-called family,	 led	by	Oleksandr	Yanukovych,	 son	of	
the	then	President.	Until	the	Maidan,	the	Family	had	been	the	
most	expansive	oligarchic	group,	which	used	thuggish	meth-
ods	to	quickly	acquire	new	assets;
•	 the group of Rinat Akhmetov,	 the	richest	man	 in	Ukraine	
and	until	recently	the	most	powerful	oligarch	whose	influence	
extended	 into	various	 sectors	 of	 the	 economy,	 ranging	 from	
energy	(DTEK),	metallurgy	and	the	coal	industry	(Metinvest),	
to	the	financial	sector	(PUMB	bank),	the	media	(the	Ukraina	
channel,	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 television	 stations	 in	 Ukraine),	
the	 agricultural	 sector	 (HarvEast)	 and	 telecommunications	
(Ukrtelecom);
•	 the group of Dmytro firtash with	 influence	mainly	 in	 the	
chemical	and	gas	sectors	(DF	Group)	and	the	media	(the	Inter	
TV	channel,	among	others).	Firtash,	one	of	the	most	influen-
tial	entrepreneurs	during	the	rule	of	Viktor	Yushchenko	and	
then	 Viktor	 Yanukovych,	 is	 one	 of	 the	 Ukrainian	 oligarchs	
4	 For	more	information,	see:	S.	Matuszak,	The	oligarchic	democracy.	The	influ-
ence	of	business	groups	on	Ukrainian	politics,	OSW Studies,	September	2012,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_42_en_0.pdf
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who	maintain	very	close	ties	with	Russia.	At	the	onset	of	his	
career	he	traded	in	Russian	gas,	and	Gazprombank	provided	
the	loans	to	finance	his	expansion	in	the	energy	sector;
•	 the group of Ihor kolomoyskyi,	one	of	Ukraine’s	most	pow-
erful	oligarchic	groups	since	 the	 1990s,	active	mainly	 in	 the	
finance	sector	 (PrivatBank,	Ukraine’s	 largest	financial	 insti-
tution),	 the	 energy	 sector	 (Ukrnafta,	 the	main	player	 in	 the	
oil	market),	 the	chemical,	metallurgic	and	 transport	 sectors	
(MAU	airlines),	the	media	(the	1+1	TV	channel	and	others)	and	
agriculture	(Privat	Agro-Holding).	
As	a	direct	consequence	of	the	Revolution	of	Dignity,	the	Family	
completely	 lost	 its	significance	 in	the	Ukrainian	oligarchic	sys-
tem	as	 its	 leading	members	 (including	 the	Yanukovych	 family,	
the	 former	 deputy	 prime	minister	 Serhiy	Arbuzov,	 the	 former	
energy	 minister	 Eduard	 Stavitsky	 and	 their	 associate	 Serhiy	
Kurchenko)	fled	 to	Russia.	At	 the	 same	 time	 Ihor	Kolomoyskyi	
managed	to	expand	his	influence.	He	quickly	entered	an	al	liance	
with	the	new	government	and	in	March	2014	was	appointed	the	
governor	 of	 the	 Dnipropetrovsk	 oblast,	 his	 home	 region,	 and	
where	most	of	his	business	assets	are	located.	He	managed	to	ef-
fectively	 stabilise	 this	 strategically	 important	 region	 in	 the	di-
rect	vicinity	of	the	Donbas,	which,	combined	with	his	skilful	use	
of	 anti-Russian	 rhetoric,	 substantially	 boosted	 his	 popularity	
and	political	influence.	
The	 remaining	 two	major	 groups	 emerged	 substantially	 weak-
ened.	Rinat	Akhmetov,	one	of	the	main	business	beneficiaries	of	
the	Party	of	Regions’	four-year	rule,	lost	control	of	some	of	his	as-
sets	in	the	war-torn	Donbas,	even	though	in	the	initial	phase	of	
the	conflict	he	informally	supported	the	so-called	separatists	 in	
the	hope	that	this	would	give	him	an	instrument	to	put	pressure	
on	Kyiv	and	boost	his	political	significance	while	also	providing	
him	with	political	immunity.	Dmytro	Firtash,	on	the	other	hand,	
was	arrested	 in	March	2014	 in	Vienna	at	 the	 request	of	 the	FBI	
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and	spent	more	 than	a	year	under	home	arrest	until,	 in	an	un-
precedented	ruling,	an	Austrian	court	refused	to	hand	him	over	
to	the	United	States.	Since	that	time,	he	has	been	living	in	Austria,	
but	his	political	and	business	interests	in	Ukraine	continue	to	be	
curated	by	Serhiy	Lyovochkin,	an	 influential	deputy,	one	of	 the	
leaders	of	the	Opposition	Bloc	(a	grouping	of	people	formerly	as-
sociated	with	the	Party	of	Regions)	and	the	former	chief	of	Presi-
dent	Yanukovych’s	administration.	It	should	be	noted	that	while	
the	political	importance	of	Akhmetov	and	Firtash	declined	in	the	
aftermath	of	the	revolution,	they	have	not	been	expropriated.5	
As	 a	 result,	when	 social	 and	political	mobilisation	was	high	di-
rectly	after	the	Maidan	and	the	country	was	ready	to	undertake	
painful	reforms,	the	 ‘old’	oligarchs	found	themselves	on	the	de-
fensive,	 uncertain	 about	 the	 future	 of	 their	 business	 interests.	
Their	 position	 was	 threatened	 by	 the	 programme	 for	 systemic	
repair	of	the	state,	envisaged	in	the	Association	Agreement	with	
the	UE,	 the	 IMF	assistance	programme	and	the	coalition	agree-
ment	concluded	in	late	2014,	because	their	businesses	had	hither-
to	thrived	thanks	to	corruption-based	deals	with	the	authorities	
and	rigged	public	tenders	and	privatisations.	The	secret	of	the	oli-
garchic	business	empires’	success	lay	primarily	in	their	relations	
with	politicians	and	their	parasitic	exploitation	of	the	state.	
Yet	despite	the	initial	uncertainty	and	problems,	the	‘old’	oligarchs	
managed	 to	 keep	 their	 status	 as	 important	 players	 in	 Ukraine’s	
politics	and	economy.6	Several	factors	contributed	to	this.	Firstly,	
a	de-oligarchisation	of	Ukraine	that	would	have	genuinely	stripped	
the	most	powerful	oligarchs	of	influence,	including	by	prosecuting	
them,	would	have	been	difficult	to	carry	out	in	the	conditions	of	
5	 In	autumn	2014	Firtash’s	DF	Group	lost	control	of	the	two	titanium	plants	it	
had	leased	from	the	state.	
6	 For	more	information,	see:	W.	Konończuk,	Oligarchs	after	the	Maidan:	the	
old	system	in	a	‘new’	Ukraine,	OSW Commentary,	16	February	2015,	http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-02-16/oligarchs-
after-maidan-old-system-a-new-ukraine
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ongoing	war	with	Russia.	It	would	have	inevitably	led	to	open	po-
litical	conflict	because	of	possible	retaliatory	action	on	the	part	of	
the	oligarchs	who	controlled	many	sectors	of	the	economy,	and	as	
a	consequence	would	have	seriously	destabilised	the	internal	situ-
ation.	Secondly,	the	oligarchs’	organisational	strength	and	finan-
cial	capabilities	were	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	weakness	of	the	cen-
tral	government	bodies,	which	did	not	make	for	a	coherent	political	
camp	and	often	had	divergent	interests.	The	oligarchic	groups	took	
advantage	of	these	divisions.	Thirdly,	the	oligarchs	retained	cer-
tain	instruments	to	influence	politics,	including	in	particular	over	
some	deputies	and	control	of	nearly	all	major	television	stations.	
The	 channels	 owned	 by	 the	 four	 oligarchs	 (Ihor	 Kolo	moyskyi,	
Dmytro	 Firtash,	 Viktor	 Pinchuk	 and	 Rinat	 Akhmetov)	 together	
control	77%	of	the	Ukrainian	market.7	Finally	and	most	important-
ly,	the	oligarchic	system	had	entered	an	alliance	with	sections	of	
the	post-Maidan	political	elite,	enabling	the	oligarchs	to	survive,	
remain	 in	politics	 despite	 the	weakening	 of	 their	 positions,	 and	
preserve	much	of	their	business	influence.	
Chart 1.	The	oligarchs’	shares	in	Ukraine’s	television	market	
(May	2016)
Ihor Kolomoyskyi – 20%
Dmytro Firtash,
Serhiy Lyovochkin – 21%
Viktor Pinchuk – 23%
Rinat Akhmetov – 13%
Petro Poroshenko < 1%
other oligarchs – 5%
other – 17 %
Source:	Television	Industry	Committee
7	 Author’s	own	calculations,	based	on	figures	from	the	Television	Industry	
Committee	(May	2016),	http://tampanel.com.ua/
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Chart 2.	The	oligarchs’	shares	in	Ukraine’s	banking	sector	
(April	2016)8
Ihor Kolomoyskyi (PRIVATBANK) – 21%
other oligarchs – 7%
Russian capital – 15%
other – 57%
Source:	National	Bank	of	Ukraine
2. Co-operation with the new government
The	parliamentary	elections	 in	October	2014,	conducted	under	
the	 restored	 2004	 constitution	 which	 weakened	 presidential	
powers	while	strengthening	the	Verkhovna Rada,	marked	a	cru-
cial	moment	in	the	oligarchs’	struggle	to	regain	political	signifi-
cance.	 Election	 campaigns	 in	Ukraine	 are	 traditionally	 among	
the	most	 expensive	 in	 Europe,	 each	 time	 costing	 hundreds	 of	
millions	 of	 dollars	 according	 to	 estimates.9	 In	 the	 conditions	
prevalent	in	Ukraine,	it	is	the	oligarchs	who	provide	most	of	the	
funding	–	a	 fact	 that	 is	one	of	 the	keys	 to	understanding	 their	
role	in	the	Ukrainian	political	system.	All	the	major	oligarchic	
groups	entered	 the	battle	 for	seats	 in	 the	new	parliament,	and	
8	 Before	2014,	 the	oligarchs’	banks	accounted	 for	a	much	greater	 share	of	
Ukraine’s	banking	sector.	However,	the	economic	crisis	caused	a	number	
of	bankruptcies,	and	the	banks	affected	included	the	Nadra	bank	(Dmytro	
Firtash),	Finances	and	Credit	(Kostyantyn	Zhevago),	and	Financial	Initiative	
(Oleg	Bakhmatyuk).	
9	 According	to	election	experts	quoted	by	the	BBC,	the	total	campaign	spend-
ing	 by	 all	 Ukrainian	 parties	 ahead	 of	 the	 2012	 parliamentary	 elections	
amounted	to	US$2.5	billion.	С. Дорош, ‘Виборча реклама: 20 млрд.гривень 
за любов народу‘,	BBC,	11	October	2012,	http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/
politics/2012/10/121011_election_ukraine_advertising_cost_sd.shtml
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managed	to	place	their	people	on	the	lists	of	nearly	all	major	par-
ties.	While	it	is	difficult	to	precisely	gauge	the	influence	that	the	
oligarchs	hold	over	individual	political	formations,	an	analysis	
of	 the	 Verkhovna Rada’s	 activities	 during	much	 of	 the	 present	
term	suggests	that	Ihor	Kolomoyskyi	is	particularly	influential	
in	 Arseniy	 Yatsenyuk’s	 People’s	 Front,	 the	 Radical	 Party	 and	
the	 Revival	 party,	while	 Dmytro	 Firtash	 has	 substantial	 clout	
in	parts	of	 the	Petro	Poroshenko	Bloc	 (the	 former	UDAR	party	
of	Vitali	Klitschko)	and	the	Opposition	Bloc.	Moreover,	some	of	
the	Opposition	Bloc	deputies	are	controlled	by	Rinat	Akhmetov	
whose	business	partner,	the	oligarch	Vadim	Novinsky,	has	been	
elected	to	parliament	from	the	Bloc’s	list.	
Chart 3.	The	influence	of	major	oligarchs	on	political	parties
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Ihor Kolomoyskyi Dmytro Firtash Rinat Akhmetov no consistent influence
In	 the	 parliamentary	 elections,	 the	 ‘old’	 oligarchs	 reasserted	
their	 status	 as	 important	 ‘stakeholders’	 in	 Ukrainian	 politics,	
and	as	a	result	the	new	leadership	started	to	find	them	necessary.	
Subsequent	 developments	 demonstrated	 that	 what	 had	 hap-
pened	was	effectively	a	marriage	between	the	oligarchic	groups	
and	 sections	of	 the	political	 elite	 that	 came	 to	power	 in	 the	af-
termath	of	the	Maidan.	The	two	centres	of	power	in	Kyiv,	i.e.	the	
camps	of	the	president	and	the	prime	minister,	entered	informal	
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agreements	with	the	most	powerful	oligarchs	 independently	of	
each	other,	under	which	the	politicians	offered	guarantees	that	
the	oligarchs’	assets	would	be	safe,	in	return	for	political	and	me-
dia	support.	The	indications	that	this	was	indeed	the	case	include	
the	fact	that	Kyiv	did	not	launch	a	single	prosecution	against	any	
of	the	oligarchs,	and	did	not	even	threaten	to	reverse	the	Yanuko-
vych-era	privatisations,	which	in	many	case	had	been	illegal	and	
conducted	solely	in	the	oligarchs’	interests.	On	the	contrary,	some	
oligarchic	 groups	were	 even	 allowed	 to	 expand	 their	 holdings;	
for	 instance	Akhmetov	 took	 over	 the	Dniprodzerzhynsk	 Coke-
Chemical	Plant	from	the	Russian	Evraz	company,	while	Firtash	
sought	to	take	over	a	stake	in	the	VOG	filling	station	chain,	one	of	
the	largest	in	Ukraine;	and	Inter,	his	television	station,	has	had	
its	licence	extended.10	
The	actions	of	the	Ukrainian	leadership	hardly	reflected	its	initial	
rhetoric.	For	instance,	in	March	2015	President	Poroshenko	said:	
“De-oligarchisation	is	my	key	starting	position.	We	are	trying	to	
introduce	order	 in	 the	country,	and	 they	are	 the	chaos.”11	These	
words,	however,	were	not	followed	by	any	real	steps	to	actually	
curb	 the	 oligarchs’	 influence.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 deep	 economic	
crisis	 in	 Ukraine	 has	 caused	 serious	 problems	 for	many	 of	 the	
oligarchic	companies,	some	of	which	have	been	unable	 to	repay	
their	banking	loans.	Some	were	also	adversely	affected	after	their	
access	 to	 tenders	 and	 public	 procurement	 procedures,	 a	 steady	
source	of	great	profits	under	Yanukovych,	was	cut	off	or	restrict-
ed.	Consequently,	the	wealth	of	most	of	the	Ukrainian	oligarchs	
has	shrunk,	as	can	been	seen	in	the	most	recent	Forbes	ranking	of	
the	world’s	richest	people.12	While	the	accumulated	assets	of	the	
10	 A. Джумайло, Е. Хвостик, ‘Владельцы Evraz сдали кокс’,	Kommersant,	28	Au-
gust	2015,	http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2797444
11	 ‘Порошенко об Укрнафте: Это не конфликт во власти, ключевое – деоли-
гархизация‘,	pravda.com.ua,	29	March	2015,	http://www.epravda.com.ua/
rus/news/2015/03/29/535932/
12	 Akhmetov’s	wealth	 is	currently	estimated	at	US$2.3	billion,	compared	to	
US$6.7	billion	in	2015	and	US$16	billion	in	2012.	The	value	of	assets	held	by	Ihor	
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five	wealthiest	Ukrainians	were	estimated	at	US$25	billion	in	2013	
(14%	of	Ukraine’s	GDP	at	that	time),	in	2016	this	figure	decreased	
three-fold	to	US$7.1	billion.
One	could	point	 to	many	examples	of	how	the	new	government	
failed	 to	dismantle	 the	 arrangements,	 dating	back	 to	 the	Yanu-
kovych	era,	that	had	been	generating	substantial	profits	for	some	
of	 the	 ‘old’	 oligarchs	 (even	 if	 it	 did	 not	 do	 anything	 to	 actively	
further	those	oligarchs’	interests).	For	instance,	deputies	in	Yat-
senyuk’s	party	long	obstructed	the	amendment	of	the	joint	stock	
companies	bill,	as	a	result	of	which	some	oligarchs	would	cease	
to	 exercise	 control	 over	 important	 enterprises,	 in	 which	 they	
had	been	taking	all	the	management	decisions	despite	only	hold-
ing	minority	stakes.	When	the	bill	was	ultimately	amended,	Ihor	
Kolomoyskyi	ceased	exercising	his	long-term	operational	control	
over	the	energy	company	Ukrnafta,	in	which	he	had	held	42%	of	
shares	 (with	 the	 State	 Treasury	 holding	 51%).	However,	 for	 un-
clear	 reasons	 the	 government	 still	 permitted	 him	 to	 postpone	
the	repayment	of	outstanding	tax	amounting	to	around	US$400	
million.	The	People’s	Front	was	particularly	active	 in	defending	
Akhmetov’s	interests,	which	appears	to	confirm	the	existence	of	
unclear	links	between	this	oligarch	and	Yatsenyuk.	For	example,	
for	a	year	after	the	Revolution	of	Dignity	the	government	was	un-
able	to	lift	the	subsidies	on	electricity	exports	introduced	in	2012,	
which	had	mainly	benefited	Akhmetov’s	company	DTEK	(the	sub-
sidies	 exceeded	US$100	million	 annually).	 On	 the	 positive	 side,	
some	needed	change	did	occur	in	the	gas	sector,	which	had	tradi-
tionally	been	one	of	the	most	important	sources	of	profits	for	the	
Ukrainian	government	elite	and	the	oligarchs,	after	Ukraine	first	
restricted	and	then	discontinued	gas	purchases	from	Russia,	and	
the	government	 imposed	greater	transparency	on	Naftogaz	and	
Kolomoyskyi	and	his	business	partner	Hennadiy	Boholubov	has	not	changed;	
the	wealth	of	each	of	them	is	estimated	at	US$1.3	billion.	The	wealth	of	Vik-
tor	Pinchuk	has	shrunk	from	US$1.5	billion	to	US$1.2	billion.	The	World’s	
Billionaires	2016.	http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/#version:static_
country:Ukraine
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adopted	the	fundamental	new	gas	market	law	in	April	2015,	initi-
ating	the	reform	process	in	that	sector.	
The	only	major	conflict	between	the	‘old’	oligarchs	and	the	post-
Maidan	 leadership	 (specifically	 the	 president)	 occurred	 after	
Poroshenko	 removed	Kolomoyskyi	 from	his	post	 as	 governor	of	
Dnipropetrovsk	in	March	2015	because	of	the	oligarch’s	growing	
influence	and	his	efforts	to	keep	control	of	the	profitable	Ukrnafta	
company.	The	conflict	has	since	been	smoothed	out,	although	Ko-
lomoyskyi’s	growing	political	ambitions	have	nonetheless	 led	 to	
the	arrest	of	his	main	aide,	Hennadiy	Korban,	who	had	been	 in	
charge	of	building	up	UKROP,	a	new	party	that	was	quite	success-
ful	in	the	local	elections	in	October	2015.	Yet	Kolomoyskyi’s	busi-
ness	interests	were	not	affected,	and	even	though	Korban	remains	
under	house	arrest,	there	are	many	indications	that	the	president	
(who	controls	the	Prosecutor’s	Office)	and	the	Dnipropetrovsk	oli-
garch	have	come	to	terms.
In	 the	aftermath	of	 the	government	 coalition	 crisis	 in	 the	first	
months	of	2016,	and	then	the	coalition’s	break-up	following	the	
exit	of	Batkivshchyna	and	Self-Reliance,	the	influence	of	the	‘old’	
oligarchic	groups	 increased.	The	Poroshenko	Bloc	and	 the	Peo-
ple’s	Front,	which	even	before	could	not	fully	count	on	the	sup-
port	of	the	remaining	coalition	members,	entered	an	informal	de 
facto	coalition	with	three	opposition	parties:	the	Opposition	Bloc,	
Revival	and	People’s	Will,	all	controlled	by	oligarchs.	After	many	
weeks	of	disputes,	Yatsenyuk	was	ultimately	persuaded	to	step	
down,	and	on	14	April	the	government	endorsed	a	new	government	
led	by	Volodymyr	Groysman	and	 supported	by	 the	Poroshenko	
Bloc	and	the	People’s	Front.	It	has	been	possible	to	largely	recre-
ate	the	old	coalition	and	thus	end	the	government	crisis	because	
the	interests	of	the	Poroshenko	and	Yatsenyuk	camps	and	the	oli-
garchic	fractions	converged.	None	of	these	groups	are	currently	
interested	in	early	elections,	which	would	have	been	the	only	al-
ternative	if	they	had	failed	to	reach	an	agreement.	This	appears	
to	demonstrate	again	that	there	is	a	symbiosis,	surprising	at	first	
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sight,	between	sections	of	the	post-Maidan	political	elite	and	the	
‘old’	oligarchic	groups.
The	new	Ukrainian	coalition	and	the	Groysman	government	are	
weaker	 than	 the	 previous	 coalition	 and	 the	 Yatsenyuk	 govern-
ment	were,	as	they	only	possess	a	very	slim	majority	in	the	Verk-
hovna Rada	(227	votes,	the	necessary	minimum	being	226)	and	are	
internally	unstable.	A	kind	of	 internal	opposition	exists	within	
the	Poroshenko	Bloc,	 i.e.	a	group	of	more	than	a	dozen	deputies	
who	often	vote	differently	from	the	rest	of	the	faction	(e.g.	 they	
voted	against	endorsing	the	government).	This	means	that	in	fu-
ture	votes,	 the	coalition	will	have	 to	 seek	help	of	 the	oligarchic	
Revival	and	People’s	Will	parties,	which	have	23	and	19	deputies	
respectively.	Both	are	within	the	orbit	of	Kolomoyskyi’s	influence	
and	voted	to	support	the	Groysman	government,	which	suggests	
that	there	is	 indeed	a	parallel,	 informal	coalition.	In	some	votes	
the	government	may	also	count	on	the	support	of	the	Opposition	
Bloc	and	Oleh	Lyashko’s	Radical	Party,	where	oligarchic	influence	
is	also	 strong.	However,	 each	 time	 the	government	will	have	 to	
pay	 a	price	 for	 the	 extra	votes	by	 offering	 concrete	 concessions	
to	 the	oligarchs.	This	 is	how	 the	weakness	of	 the	new	coalition	
works	as	one	of	the	factors	conserving	the	old	system	and	hinder-
ing	reforms.
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II. New OlIgARChS IN The gOveRNMeNT
While	the	‘old’	oligarchs’	made	successful	efforts	to	preserve	their	
influence	in	business	and	politics,	as	discussed	above,	the	last	two	
years	also	saw	a	parallel	process	whereby	people	with	close	links	to	
the	new	top	leadership	of	Ukraine	strove	to	build	up	business	bases	
of	their	own.	This	process	has	followed	a	pattern	typical	for	each	
new	administration	in	Ukraine	–	of	taking	operational	control	over	
the	most	valuable	state-owned	enterprises	in	order	to	control	their	
financial	flows	and,	usually,	to	profit	illegally	at	the	expense	of	the	
state	budget.
After	the	Maidan,	groups	of	trusted	people	formed	around	the	then	
Prime	Minister	Yatsenyuk	and	President	Poroshenko	(himself	an	
oligarch	prior	to	taking	power,	albeit	a	less	influential	one).	Those	
groups,	comprised	of	politicians	and	large	entrepreneurs	with	close	
links	to	them,	set	out	to	systematically	expand	their	influence	on	
key	state-owned	businesses.	Some	of	their	members	have	also	tried	
to	acquire	ownership	of	state-owned	businesses.	While	this	process	
is	far	from	transparent	and	has	not	been	fully	studied	yet,	it	may	
be	argued	that	sections	of	the	new	government	elite	have	been	ef-
fectively	replicating	the	patterns	of	corruption	that	were	prevalent	
in	Ukraine	under	the	previous	governments.	As	in	the	past,	control	
of	individual	ministries	and	state	bodies,	which	are	seen	as	politi-
cal	spoils,	has	been	instrumental	in	taking	operational	control	over	
business	assets.	Moreover,	there	are	many	indications	that	people	
representing	 the	 new	 leadership	 have	 taken	 over	 businesses	 (or	
stakes	therein)	formerly	held	by	people	associated	with	the	Family.13	
13	 After	the	Maidan,	the	new	government	waited	for	many	months	before	tak-
ing	any	steps	against	business	assets	held	by	people	from	Viktor	Yanuko-
vych’s	circle,	and	even	then	targeted	only	a	small	section	of	those	assets.	It	
would	be	difficult	to	find	any	explanation	for	this	other	than	a	secret	deal	that	
seems	to	have	been	struck	between	the	‘old’	and	the	‘new’	elite,	whereby	the	
latter	took	over	some	of	the	assets	in	question	in	their	own	interest.	In	May	
2016	Yuriy	Lutsenko,	the	new	prosecutor	general,	admitted	that	the	prosecu-
tor’s	office	had	not	prepared	a	single	case	against	the	Yanukovych	regime’s	
officials	and	politicians.	
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It	may	seem	disputable	to	use	the	name	‘oligarchs’	to	denote	the	re-
sponsible	people	from	Petro	Poroshenko’s	and	Arseniy	Yatsenyuk’s	
respective	 circles,	 as	 most	 of	 them	 are	 high-ranking	 politicians	
who	 nonetheless	 already	 held	 major	 business	 assets	 when	 they	
were	elected	to	the	Verkhovna Rada.	Tracing	their	current	business	
influence	is	possible	(albeit	only	to	some	extent)	thanks	to	report-
ing	 by	 the	 Ukrainian	 media	 and	 its	 journalistic	 investigations.	
Their	operational	model	relies	on	using	the	power	they	possess	as	
representatives	 of	 the	 state	 to	 expand	 their	 businesses	 and	 take	
control	over	the	finances	of	the	most	profitable	state-owned	compa-
nies.	Those	activities	are	not	part	of	public	policy	but	belong	in	the	
domain	of	informal,	behind-the-scenes	dealings.	The	politicians	in	
question	are	furthermore	surrounded	by	powerful	business	people	
who	used	to	be	second-rank,	 less	 influential	oligarchs	during	the	
Yanukovych	era.	Since	the	Maidan,	their	business	 interests	have	
been	thriving,	thanks	to	their	links	to	the	new	leadership.	
This	process	 is	not	yet	complete.	The	 following	section	will	dis-
cuss	 what	 we	 know	 so	 far	 about	 the	 people	 from	 the	 political	
and	business	milieu	of	President	Poroshenko	and	 former	Prime	
Minister	Yatsenyuk	(the	latter	has	been	able	to	remain	one	of	the	
most	 important	players	 in	Ukraine’s	political	scene	despite	hav-
ing	 stepped	down	as	PM	 in	April	 2016,	 as	will	be	demonstrated	
below).	Given	their	modus	operandi	and	business	potential,	 it	is	
only	a	minor	simplification	to	call	these	people	the	‘new	oligarchs’.	
1. The business-political circle of president poroshenko
Ihor kononenko,	who	had	not	been	widely	known	before	he	was	
elected	to	the	Verkhovna Rada	in	2014,	is	one	of	the	most	influential	
people	in	President	Poroshenko’s	circle.	He	has	been	Poroshenko’s	
trusted	man	since	 they	did	military	 service	 together	 in	 the	So-
viet	 army	 in	 the	mid-1980s.	 Kononenko	 has	 been	 Poroshenko’s	
business	partner	since	1992;	for	example	he	has	served	for	many	
years	 as	 deputy	 CEO	 of	 Poroshenko’s	 Ukrprominvest	 holding,	
which	groups	together	companies	ranging	from	the	Roshen	sugar	
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company	to	the	Channel	5	television	station.	Both	men	hold	shares	
in	 the	 International	 Investment	 Bank	 (Poroshenko	 has	 60%	 of	
shares	and	Kononenko	14.9%)	and	in	the	Kraina	insurance	com-
pany	(in	which	the	president	controls	49.9%	of	shares).	Kononen-
ko	also	has	his	own	investment	fund	VIK	and	several	industrial	
plants	(including	in	Zaporizhia	and	Luhansk).
After	he	was	elected	deputy,	Kononenko	soon	became	a	key	figure	
(next	 to	 Yuriy	 Lutsenko)	 in	 the	 Poroshenko	 Bloc’s	 parliamentary	
club,	rising	to	the	position	of	the	club’s	deputy	chair.	In	the	local	elec-
tions	in	autumn	2015	he	was	the	party’s	chief	of	election	staff.	Over	
the	 last	 year,	 thanks	 to	his	 status	 as	 the	president’s	 close	 aide,	he	
has	become	one	of	the	most	influential	figures	in	Ukrainian	politics,	
which	has	also	boosted	his	business	influence.	Several	 large	state-
owned	companies,	mainly	from	the	energy	sector,	have	found	them-
selves	in	Kononenko’s	orbit,	including	Centrenergo,	which	produces	
14%	of	Ukraine’s	total	electricity,	and	has	been	tipped	for	privatisa-
tion.	 Kononenko	 has	 been	 influencing	 the	 energy	 sector	 through	
his	 close	 ties	 with	 Volodymyr	 Demchyshyn,	 the	 energy	 minister	
in	Yatsenyuk’s	cabinet	(who	was	replaced	by	Ihor	Nasalyk	in	April)	
and	Dmytro	Vovk,	 chief	 of	 the	 energy	 regulator	NKREKP,	both	of	
whom	are	the	president’s	men	and	have	previously	worked	in	com-
panies	controlled	by	Poroshenko.	A	conflict	with	Kononenko	was	in	
the	background	of	the	widely	publicised	dismissal	in	February	2016	
of	Aivaras	Abromavičius,	 the	minister	 for	 economic	development.	
The	minister,	who	had	been	widely	regarded	as	one	of	the	main	re-
formers	 in	 Yatsenyuk’s	 government,	 directly	 accused	 Kononenko	
of	corruption	and	of	promoting	his	people	to	high	positions	in	many	
important	state-owned	companies,	including	Naftogaz	and	compa-
nies	in	the	metallurgy	and	chemical	sectors,	in	order	to	control	their	
financial	 flows.	 The	 stated,	 immediate	 reason	 for	 Abromavičius’s	
dismissal	concerned	his	refusal	to	accept	the	nomination	of	a	Konon-
enko	designee	as	deputy	minister	in	charge	of	supervising	Naftogaz.	
Kononenko	was	also	implicated	in	another	high-profile	resigna-
tion,	that	of	deputy	Prosecutor	General	Vitaly	Kasko,	who	accused	
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Kononenko	of	 interfering	with	the	operation	of	the	prosecutor’s	
office	as	he	stepped	down	in	mid-February	2016.14	Kasko	said	on	
that	occasion:	“The	General	Prosecutor’s	Office	is	a	dead	body	in	
whose	independence	no-one	believes	(…),	has	ultimately	become	
an	institution	ruled	by	a	clique	(krugovaya poruka)	where	any	at-
tempts	 at	 changing	 the	 situation	 from	 within	 are	 kept	 down.”	
However,	even	those	widely	publicised	resignations	failed	to	af-
fect	Kononenko’s	 position.	 In	 early	March,	 his	 former	 assistant	
was	appointed	as	deputy	chief	of	the	State	Property	Fund,	where	
he	will	supervise	the	privatisation	of	Centrenergo,	among	other	
tasks.15	Kononenko	also	has	some	 influence	 in	 the	Security	Ser-
vice	of	Ukraine,	 a	 fact	 that	 seals	his	 status	as	one	of	 the	people	
with	the	strongest	influence	in	Ukrainian	politics.16
Chart 4.	Shares	of	oligarchic	groups	in	Ukraine’s	electricity	
market
DTEK (Rinat Akhmetov) – 25%
ENERGOATOM (Mykola Martynenko) – 56%
UKRHIDROENERGO – 5%
CENTRENERGO (Ihor Kononenko) – 4%
DONBASENERGO (Oleksandr Yanukovych) – 3%
other – 7%
14	 Ally	of	Ukrainian	president	accused	of	meddling	in	prosecution,	Reuters,	
25	February	2015,	http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-president-
ally-idUSKCN0VY1RP?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews	
15	 Заступником голови Фонду держмайна призначений екс-помічник Ко-
но ненка,	pravda.com.ua,	1	March	2016,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/news	
/2016/03/1/7100817/
16	 As	confirmed	by	the	SBU	deputy	chief,	General	Viktor	Trepak,	dismissed	in	
April	2016.	‘Виктор Трепак: “Я передал в НАБУ доказательства тотальной 
коррумпированности власти”’,	ZN.ua,	27	May	2016,	http://gazeta.zn.ua/
internal/viktor-trepak-ya-peredal-v-nabu-dokazatelstva-totalnoy-korrum-
pirovannosti-vlasti-_.html
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konstantin grigorishin,	 a	 Ukrainian	 entrepreneur	 with	
a	Russian	passport,	 is	 another	 oligarch	with	 very	 close	 ties	 to	
President	Poroshenko.	He	started	his	career	in	the	1990s	by	sell-
ing	metallurgic	products	to	Russia,	but	nearly	all	of	his	business	
assets,	worth	 an	 estimated	 US$1.2	 billion	 according	 to	 Forbes,	
are	located	in	Ukraine.17	Among	other	business	interests,	Grigor-
ishin	controls	75%	of	shares	in	Zaporozhtransformator,	Europe’s	
largest	transformer	manufacturer;	15%	of	shares	in	Turboatom,	
which	 manufactures	 steam	 turbines	 for	 thermal	 and	 nuclear	
power	 plants;	 Dneprospetsstal;	 and	 the	 Ukrrichflot	 holding	
which	owns	several	river	ports.	Despite	the	crisis,	most	of	these	
companies	 have	 been	 among	 Ukraine’s	 most	 profitable	 busi-
nesses.	Grigorishin	moreover	holds	stakes	in	9	out	of	Ukraine’s	
25	 oblgazes,	 i.e.	 regional	 gas	 distribution	 companies,18	 making	
him	one	of	the	most	important	players	in	Ukraine’s	energy	sec-
tor.	He	has	been	active	in	politics	for	the	last	dozen	years	or	so;	
for	example,	he	financed	the	Communist	Party	before	2012	and	
Viktor	 Medvedchuk’s	 SDPU(u)	 party	 before	 the	 Orange	 Revo-
lution.	 In	 the	 years	 2008–2009	 he	 was	 banned	 from	 entering	
Ukraine	at	the	request	of	the	SBU.	
Grigorishin	has	been	involved	in	business	co-operation	with	Po-
roshenko	for	around	ten	years;	for	example	the	two	men	co-owned	
the	 Sevastopol	 dockyard	 (nationalised	 by	 the	 Russian	 govern-
ment	in	2015),	control	a	six-hectare	plot	in	central	Kyiv,	and	tried	
to	 buy	 out	 the	 Inter	 television	 station	 together	 in	 2007.	Grigor-
ishin’s	influence	in	the	Ukrainian	economy,	especially	the	energy	
sector,	increased	after	Poroshenko	was	elected	president.	In	late	
2014	Yuriy	Kasich,	who	had	previously	worked	for	Grigorishin’s	
companies,	was	 appointed,	 at	Grigorishin’s	 recommendation,	 as	
the	CEO	of	Ukrenergo,	the	state-owned	electricity	grid	operator.	
He	was	dismissed	several	months	later	in	the	aftermath	of	a	scan-
dal	that	erupted	after	a	company	of	Grigorishin’s	won	Ukrenergo’s	
17	 http://www.forbes.ru/profile/konstantin-grigorishin
18	 He	holds	controlling	states	only	in	the	Vinnytsia	and	Zaporizhia	companies.	
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large	 tender	 for	 the	supply	of	 transformers,	which	according	 to	
market	 experts	were	 redundant	 and	 sold	 at	 an	 excessive	 price.	
The	close	ties	between	Poroshenko	and	the	Russian	oligarch	Gri-
gorishin	have	been	regularly	criticised	by	the	Ukrainian	media,	
and	the	man	himself	was	referred	to	as	an	‘FSB	agent’	by	the	then	
prime	minister	Yatsenyuk.19	However,	the	oligarch	clearly	seems	
to	feel	that	his	position	is	safe;	for	instance,	he	put	himself	forward	
as	a	candidate	to	take	the	post	of	head	of	the	presidential	admin-
istration	in	late	2015.	Grigorishin’s	efforts	to	expand	his	business	
interests	in	the	Ukrainian	electricity	sector	also	put	him	on	colli-
sion	course	with	Boris	Lozhkin,	the	presidential	administration	
chief	who	said	in	an	interview	that	the	oligarch	“did	not	like	the	
fact	that	I	did	not	support	his	efforts	to	influence	processes	in	the	
Ukrainian	energy	sector.	I	believe	that	the	state	is	the	state,	and	
private	business	is	private	business.”20	Since	the	beginning	of	this	
year,	Grigorishin	has	been	experiencing	some	legal	 troubles:	an	
investigation	into	alleged	tax	evasion	has	been	launched	against	
one	of	his	companies	at	the	initiative	of	the	interior	minister	Ar-
sen	Avakov,	who	is	a	member	of	Yatsenyuk’s	party.	In	any	case,	it	
is	quite	incredible	that	Poroshenko	still	has	not	distanced	himself	
from	Grigorishin.
Poroshenko	 also	has	 close	 links	 to	 another	 oligarch,	Yuriy ko-
siuk, the	main	 stakeholder	 in	Myronivsky	 Khliboprodukt,	 one	
of	Ukraine’s	largest	agriculture	and	food	concerns	(360,000	hec-
tares	of	agricultural	land,	producing	mostly	cereals	and	poultry),	
which	is	listed	on	the	London	Stock	Exchange.	Kosiuk’s	assets	are	
estimated	at	around	US$1	billion.	The	nature	of	his	relations	with	
the	president	is	unclear,	but	they	are	probably	based	on	the	fact	
that	large	parts	of	both	men’s	business	assets	are	concentrated	in	
19	 Страсти по Григоришину: олигарх оказался в российском розыске,	Forbes.
ua,	8	February	2016,	http://forbes.net.ua/business/1410530-strasti-po-grig-
orishinu-oligarh-okazalsya-v-rossijskom-rozyske
20	 Interview	with	Boris	Lozhkin,	Dzerkalo Tyzhnya,	13	November	2015,	http://
gazeta.zn.ua/internal/glava-administracii-prezidenta-boris-lozhkin-k-gos-
sluzhbe-otnoshus-kak-k-sluzhbe-v-armii-_.html
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the	Vinnytsia	oblast.	Shortly	after	he	was	elected	president,	Po-
roshenko	appointed	Kosiuk	as	deputy	chief	of	his	administration,	
in	charge	of	supervising	the	security	and	defence	block.	The	nom-
ination	was	quite	surprising	because	the	oligarch	had	no	previ-
ous	experience	in	that	area.	He	was	dismissed	in	December	2014	
after	 facing	mounting	criticism	over	 lobbying	 for	his	own	com-
pany	(with	regard	to	VAT	reimbursements	among	other	 things)	
and	ignoring	state	defence	issues.	Nonetheless,	Kosiuk	seems	to	
have	maintained	good	contacts	with	Poroshenko,	who	has	since	
appointed	him	as	his	advisor.	In	early	2016,	the	oligarch	gave	an	
interview	in	which	he	criticised	the	EU	Association	Agreement,	
arguing	that	 it	only	benefited	the	European	Union.21	Kosiuk	has	
a	strong	position	in	the	Ukrainian	agrarian	lobby,	which	accounts	
for	a	quarter	of	Ukraine’s	exports	and	has	been	recently	growing	
in	strength.	
The	 business	 interests	 of	 President	 petro poroshenko,	 who	
also	used	to	be	regarded	as	a	(second-rank)	oligarch	before	the	
Maidan,	deserve	separate	attention.	Poroshenko	has	not	yet	de-
livered	on	his	campaign	promise	to	sell	all	his	businesses	(ex-
cept	for	Channel	5),	which	are	worth	an	estimated	US$1.5	billion.	
The	officially	 stated	reasons	concern	 the	crisis	 and	 the	unfa-
vourable	market	situation,	which	have	driven	down	the	value	
of	 Poroshenko’s	 companies,	 including	 the	 most	 prized	 one,	
Roshen	(Poroshenko	claims	that	he	could	sell	the	company	for	
US$3	billion,	while	Nestle	has	offered	him	US$1	billion,	which	
experts	 say	 is	 a	 reasonable	market	 price).	 It	was	 only	 in	 late	
2015	that	Roshen	was	put	in	a	so-called	blind	trust	with	a	West-
ern	investment	bank.	The	company	has	expanded	considerably	
over	 the	 last	 two	years,	 and	 its	 revenues	have	 increased.	The	
small	International	Investment	Bank	controlled	by	Poroshenko	
21	 For	instance,	Kosiuk	said	that	Ukraine	“had	been	cheated	(…)	this	is	no	free	
trade	area”	because	the	EU	has	not	opened	its	markets	for	Ukrainian	agri-
cultural	products	to	the	extent	that	had	been	expected.	Юрій Косюк: «Зона 
вільної торгівлі з Європою це обман України»,	voanews.com,	17	January	
2016,	http://ukrainian.voanews.com/a/yuriy-kosyuk-eu/3149549.html
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also	managed	to	expand	its	holdings	by	as	much	as	85%	in	the	
first	year	of	the	president’s	term,	despite	the	deep	crisis	affect-
ing	 the	Ukrainian	banking	sector.22	However,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	
pinpoint	any	specific	measures	taken	by	the	government	that	
favoured	Poroshenko’s	business	 interests.	The	Ukrainian	me-
dia,	which	thoroughly	and	critically	observe	his	business	activ-
ity,	have	also	been	silent	about	it.	The	greatest	scandal	in	which	
the	Ukrainian	president	has	been	implicated	concerns	the	in-
formation	that	emerged	about	him	from	the	Panama	Papers	in	
April	2016.	The	leaked	documents	showed	that	Poroshenko	had	
registered	a	company	called	Prime	Asset	Partners	in	the	Brit-
ish	Virgin	Islands	to	act	as	a	managing	holding	for	Roshen	on	
21	August	2014,	i.e.	after	he	had	already	been	elected	president.	
While	the	revelations	delivered	a	major	blow	to	his	image	and	
triggered	criticism	from	some	of	his	political	opponents,	the	reg-
istration	of	a	company	did	not	in	itself	constitute	a	violation	of	
any	laws,	and	the	president	managed	to	emerge	unscathed	from	
the	scandal.	
2. The business-political circle of Arseniy Yatsenyuk 
and the People’s Front
The	People’s	Front	emerged	from	the	general	election	in	October	
2014	 as	 the	 second-largest	parliamentary	 club	with	81	deputies,	
and	as	a	result	its	leader	Arseniy	Yatsenyuk	was	able	to	retain	his	
post	as	prime	minister	(he	had	been	first	appointed	as	PM	in	Feb-
ruary	2014).	Even	though	he	was	forced	out	in	April	2016,	he	man-
aged	 to	 negotiate	 favourable	 conditions	 for	 his	 resignation	 and	
remains	 one	 of	 the	most	 influential	 politicians	 in	Ukraine.	The	
main	reason	for	this	is	because	the	Poroshenko	Bloc	has	no	alter-
native	to	co-operating	with	the	People’s	Front.	Indeed,	the	Front’s	
influence	in	the	Groysman	cabinet	is	even	stronger	than	before.	
22	 Банк Порошенко растет быстрее рынка,	LB.ua,	11	February	2015,	http://
economics.lb.ua/finances/2015/02/11/295223_bank_poroshenko_rastet_bis-
tree_rinka.html
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The	 foreign	 minister	 Arsen	 Avakov	 and	 justice	 minister	 Pavlo	
Petrenko	have	kept	 their	positions,	while	other	Front	members	
have	been	appointed	as	the	ministers	for	the	environment	and	ed-
ucation	and	the	deputy	minister	for	European	integration.	Andriy	
Parubiy,	one	of	the	People’s	Front’s	leaders,	is	the	Verkhovna Rada	
speaker,	and	Oleksandr	Turchynov,	 the	party’s	second	most	 im-
portant	person,	has	kept	his	job	as	head	of	the	National	Security	
and	Defence	Council.	
The	 group	 of	 Arseniy	 Yatsenyuk’s	 closest	 aides	 includes	An-
driy Ivanchuk,	deputy	chief	of	the	People’s	Front	parliamen-
tary	club	and	chair	of	one	the	Verkhovna Rada’s	most	important	
committees,	the	committee	for	economic	policy.	The	two	men’s	
acquaintance	dates	back	to	when	they	both	studied	law	at	the	
university	 in	Chernivtsi	 in	 the	 early	 1990.	 It	was	 also	 at	 that	
time	that	they	launched	their	first	business	projects	together.	
Since	then,	their	biographies	have	been	intertwined.	After	Ya-
tsenyuk	started	his	fast-track	political	career	in	2001,	Ivanchuk	
became	the	curator	of	his	business	interests.	While	Yatsenyuk	
served	as	the	minister	for	economy	(2005–2006),	Ivanchuk	was	
appointed	as	deputy	CEO	of	the	state-owned	Energy	Company	
of	Ukraine,	which	controlled	power	plants	accounting	for	near-
ly	a	third	of	Ukraine’s	total	electricity	production.	Later	he	be-
came	the	chief	of	another	state-owned	company,	the	electricity	
exporter	Ukrinterenergo.	
When	Yatsenyuk	founded	his	own	party,	the	Front	for	Change	in	
2009,	 Ivanchuk	became	its	 leader.	 In	 the	new	parliament,	 Ivan-
chuk,	who	 like	Kononenko	had	 been	 little	 known	 to	 the	 public	
before,	is	one	of	the	most	influential	persons.	His	duties	include	
maintaining	discipline	in	the	party	and	managing	contacts	with	
big	 business.	 The	 Ukrainian	 media	 have	 repeatedly	 reported	
about	Ivanchuk	acting	as	the	go-between	for	Yatsenyuk	and	the	
oligarchs,	especially	Kolomoyskyi	and	Akhmetov.	It	was	Ivanchuk	
who	in	2015	blocked	the	adoption	of	amendments	to	the	joint	stock	
companies	bill	which	would	have	harmed	Kolomoyskyi’s	interests	
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in	Ukrnafta.	By	the	way,	Kolomoyskyi	and	Ivanchuk	are	business	
partners	in	a	bioethanol	manufacturing	company.23
Ivanchuk	also	holds	a	number	of	other	business	assets,	mainly	in	
the	 foods,	 fuels,	 agriculture	and	solar	energy	sectors.	However,	
the	value	of	these	assets	is	difficult	to	estimate.	After	the	Maidan,	
he	 started	 to	 expand	his	 influence	 into	 some	 state-owned	 com-
panies,	 including	 Ukrspirt,	 Ukraine’s	 largest	 alcohol	 manufac-
turer.	 According	 to	 the	 Ukrainian	media,	 Ivanchuk	 had	 devel-
oped	a	large-scale	scheme	to	smuggle	Ukrainian	alcohol,	in	which	
he	allegedly	partnered	with	Yuriy	 Ivanyushchenko,	an	oligarch	
with	close	links	to	the	Yanukovych	family.24	Allegations	have	also	
been	publicly	levelled	at	Ivanchuk	by	the	Odessa	oblast	governor	
Mikheil	Saakashvili,	who	accused	the	oligarch	of	corruption	on	
a	massive	scale.25	However,	that	did	not	affect	Ivanchuk’s	political	
position	 in	any	way.	Meanwhile,	Ukrspirt	 is	being	prepared	 for	
privatisation.
Ivanchuk	has	links	to	another	oligarch,	leonid Yurushev,	one	of	
the	least	publicly	known	among	Ukraine’s	major	entrepreneurs.	
Yurushev	started	his	career	in	the	1990s	in	the	Donbas	where	he	
was	a	member	of	the	criminal	group	led	by	Akhat	Bragin	(the	
then	 ‘godfather’	of	Donbas),	and	has	subsequently	co-operated	
with	Rinat	Akhmetov	 and	Viktor	Yanukovych,	 among	others.	
In	2009	he	sold	his	Forum	bank	to	Germany’s	Commerzbank	and	
invested	some	of	the	proceeds	in	development	projects	in	Kyiv	
(a	luxury	hotel	chain).	Currently	Yurushev	also	owns	a	number	
of	industrial	companies,	including	in	the	rail	car	and	transport	
23	 Ігор Коломойський: Мої розмови пишуть Льовочкін з Пінчуком, 
pravda.com.ua,	 5	March	 2015,	 http://www.pravda.com.ua/arti	cles	/2015/	
03/5/7060596/
24	 Герои большого спирта, glavcom.ua,	29	October	2015,	http://glavcom.ua/
publications/132247-geroi-bolshogo-spirta.html
25	 Саакашвили оценил потери бюджета от олигархов в 5 миллиардов дол-
ларов, epravda.com.ua, 6	December	2015,	http://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/
news/2015/12/6/571099/
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sector	 (Dizelnyi	 Zavod	 in	 Kryvyi	 Rih,	 Dneprovagonremstroy	
near	Dnipro	and	Interlizinvest,	one	of	Ukraine’s	largest	private	
rail	 transport	and	forwarding	companies).	His	wealth	was	es-
timated	 at	US$900	million	 in	 2014.	 For	 several	 years	Yurush-
ev	has	been	considered	to	be	the	main	sponsor	of	Yatsenyuk’s	
party,	which	Ivanchuk	officially	admitted	recently.26	Since	the	
Maidan,	companies	controlled	by	the	oligarch	have	won	several	
lucrative	public	tenders,	including	the	biggest	ones	organised	by	
Ukrzaliznytsia	(UZ),	the	Ukrainian	railways.	The	latter	compa-
ny’s	deputy	CEO	between	2014	and	February	2016	was	Maksym	
Blank,	who	had	previously	worked	as	a	manager	in	Yurushev’s	
companies	and	who	was	accused	of	blocking	reforms	in	UZ	and	
preserving	 the	 longstanding	 corruption	patterns	 in	 that	 huge	
company	(UZ	accounts	for	around	3%	of	Ukraine’s	GDP).	In	2015	
his	company	won	a	tender	for	the	operation	of	duty	free	shops	
in	 the	 Boryspil	 airport	 near	 Kyiv.27	 Yurushev	 also	 runs	 some	
businesses	 jointly	with	Andriy	 Ivanchuk.	The	change	of	own-
ership	 of	 Kreativ,	 one	 of	 Ukraine’s	 big	 agricultural	 and	 foods	
holdings	(which	manufactures	plant	fats	among	other	commod-
ities	 and	 holds	 around	 30,000	 hectares	 of	 land),	 was	 effected	
last	year,	probably	 in	order	to	serve	the	 interests	of	Yurushev	
and	Ivanchuk.28
Mykola Martynenko, who co-chaired	the	People’s	Front	before	
December	2015,	 is	Arseniy	Yatsenyuk’s	second	most	 influential	
aide.	He	is	a	well-known	figure	in	Ukrainian	politics;	from	1998	
until	the	end	of	2015	he	served	as	deputy	to	the	Verkhovna Rada	
(initially	 representing	 Yushchenko’s	 Our	 Ukraine,	 and	 then	
26	 Андрій Іванчук: Яценюк мені ніколи нічого не пропонував,	pravda.com.
ua,	9	February	2016,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/02/9/7098391/
27	 A. Іванцова, Інфраструктура для олігарха Леоніда Юрушева,	 Radio	
Svo	boda,	 30	 October	 2015,	 http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/arti-
cle/27335723.html
28	 В. Стародубцев, Друзья Яценюка становятся миллиардерами-перера-
ботчиками,	 DSnews.ua,	 7	 September	 2015,	 http://www.dsnews.ua/poli-
tics/druzya-yatsenyuka-stanovyatsya-milliarderami-pererabotchika-
mi-05092015105200
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Batkivshchyna),	and	from	2006	till	the	end	of	2015	he	chaired	the	
Rada	 committee	 for	 the	 fuels	 and	 energy	 complex	 of	Ukraine,	
one	of	the	most	important	committees	in	the	parliament.	Keep-
ing	 that	post	under	 three	 consecutive	governments	must	have	
required	considerable	political	skill,	proving	that	Martynenko	
is	 a	man	who	 can	 come	 to	 terms	with	 practically	 any	 govern-
ment.	 Since	 2011,	Martynenko	has	been	a	member	of	Yatseny-
uk’s	 party.	 For	 the	 last	 few	years	he	has	 been	 regarded	 as	 the	
main	political	 ‘supervisor’	of	Energoatom,	the	state-owned	op-
erator	of	all	Ukrainian	nuclear	power	plants	which	account	for	
half	of	the	country’s	total	electricity	output.	In	April	2015	Mykola	
Gordienko,	the	chief	of	the	State	Financial	Inspection	(PIF),	pub-
licly	accused	Yatsenyuk	of	having	taken	over	and	protecting	the	
Yanukovych-era	 corruption	mechanisms.	He	 said	 that	Mykola	
Martynenko	 was	 co-responsible	 for	 numerous	 irregularities	
and	 embezzlement	 at	 Energoatom,	 worth	 around	 €50	million.	
Gordienko	 estimated	 that	 the	 state	 budget	 had	 lost	more	 than	
7.5	billion	hryvnia	(around	US$300	million)	as	a	result,	also	also	
pointed	to	irregularities	in	other	state-owned	companies	over-
seen	 by	 Yatsenyuk’s	 people	 (including	 Ukrgazvydobuvannya,	
the	Ukrainian	Railways	and	the	Ukrainian	Post),	detected	in	the	
course	of	PIF	checks.29	He	claimed	that	the	government	had	been	
obstructing	investigations	into	corruption	schemes	that	existed	
under	the	previous	government.	The	only	result	of	these	allega-
tions	was	that	the	PIF	chief	was	forced	to	resign	and	the	affair	
was	swept	under	the	carpet.	However,	bringing	the	crisis	under	
control	was	 only	 possible	 thanks	 to	 an	 informal	 deal	 between	
the	prime	minister	and	the	president,	who	controls	the	prosecu-
tor’s	office.
In	late	2014	the	Czech	press	reported	that	Swiss	prosecution	au-
thorities	 had	 launched	 an	 investigation	 against	 Martynenko,	
29	 Документи Гордієнка: що відсторонений голова Держфінінспекції на-
дав депутатам,	pravda.com.ua,	8	April	2015,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/
news/2015/04/8/7064163/
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who	was	accused	of	accepting	a	bribe	of	US$30	million	from	the	
Czech	 Republic’s	 Škoda	 JS	 in	 return	 for	 ensuring	 the	 company	
was	awarded	a	contract	for	the	supply	of	devices	to	Energoatom.30	
Martynenko	resigned	as	deputy	in	December	2015	but	the	Ukrain-
ian	prosecutor’s	office	has	yet	to	interrogate	him.31	The	chief	of	the	
National	Anti-Corruption	Office	has	publicly	said	 that	 the	pros-
ecutor’s	office	was	blocking	 the	 transfer	of	documents	concern-
ing	 the	 investigation	 against	Martynenko.32	His	 business	 inter-
ests	 also	 extend	 to	 other	 state-owned	 companies,	 the	 largest	 of	
which	include	the	Odessa	Port	Plant,	a	giant	chemical	company,	
and	the	United	Mining	and	Chemical	Company.	How	many	com-
panies	Martynenko	 owns	 privately	 is	 not	 known.	What	 we	 do	
know	is	that	he	owns	Austria’s	Antra	GMBH,	one	of	the	main	im-
porters	of	gas	to	Ukraine,	which	supplies	gas	to	the	Odessa	Port	
Plant	mentioned	 above.33	 The	 Ukrainian	media	 have	 repeatedly	
accused	Martynenko	of	 corruption	and	of	being	Yatsenyuk’s	de 
facto	‘treasurer’,	but	these	revelations	have	achieved	nothing.	Re-
sponding	to	the	allegations,	the	oligarch	said	in	a	rare	interview	
that	the	aim	of	the	campaign	to	discredit	him	was	to	“destabilise	
the	state”	and	“defend	the	oligarchs’	interests”.34	
30	 Chef	der	ukrainischen	Atombehörde	soll	in	der	Schweiz	Geld	verstecken,	
Sonntag Zeitung,	 22	 March	 2015,	 http://www.sonntagszeitung.ch/read/
sz_22_03_2015/nachrichten/Chef-der-ukrainischen-Atombehoerde-soll-
in-der-Schweiz-Geld-verstecken-30868
31	 С. Мусаева-Боровик, А. Самофалов, Ядерное обогащение Николая Марты-
ненко,	pravda.com.ua,	9	November	2015,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/
articles/2015/11/9/7087675/
32	 Артем Сытник: “Гарантии независимости НАБУ в законе соблюдены. 
Ответственность — на мне и моей команде”,	ZN.ua,	3	March	2016,	http://
gazeta.zn.ua/internal/artem-sytnik-garantii-nezavisimosti-nabu-v-za-
kone-soblyudeny-otvetstvennost-na-mne-i-moey-komande-_.html
33	 Новый тренд. Частный бизнес осваивает импорт газа из ЕС, Liga.net,	
4	March	2016,	http://biz.liga.net/all/tek/stati/3271195-novyy-trend-chast-
nyy-biznes-osvaivaet-import-gaza-iz-es.htm
34	 Мартиненко звинуватив у кампанії проти себе олігархів, BBC,	30	Novem-
ber	2015,	http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news_in_brief/2015/11/151130_vs_
martynenko_statement
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Chart 5.	Links	of	the	main	oligarchic	groups	in	Ukraine
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III. The De-OlIgARChISATION ThAT NeveR 
hAppeNeD 
Several	weeks	 before	he	 stepped	down	as	 prime	minister,	Ar-
seniy	 Yatsenyuk	 said:	 “We	 have	 managed	 to	 destroy	 the	 sys-
temic,	mafia-style	corruption	at	 the	very	 top	of	government.”35	
A	closer	look	at	the	situation	in	Ukraine’s	politics	and	the	econ-
omy,	and	at	the	relationships	between	the	government	and	big	
business,	shows	that	this	is	purely	wishful	thinking.	The	oligar-
chic	system,	which	intrinsically	involves	corruption	and	infor-
mal	ties	between	the	oligarchs	and	the	top	tiers	of	government,	
did	not	disappear	after	the	Maidan;	it	merely	evolved	slightly	to	
adapt	to	the	new	political	situation.	The	long-established	main	
oligarchic	 groups	 started	more	 or	 less	 close	 co-operation	with	
the	government	elite,	which	needed	their	support	and	was	at	the	
same	time	too	weak	or	lacked	the	political	will	to	really	under-
mine	the	oligarchs’	positions.	It	is	true	that	most	of	the	‘old’	oli-
garchs	emerged	considerably	weaker	after	2014	(partly	as	a	re-
sult	of	the	economic	crisis	in	Ukraine),	no	longer	enjoy	the	same	
level	of	influence	on	the	government,	and	cannot	participate	in	
public	procurement	on	the	same	scale	as	before.	However,	they	
nonetheless	continue	to	rank	among	the	most	influential	actors	
in	Ukrainian	politics.	As	a	result,	despite	some	reshuffling,	the	
oligarchic	system	again	persisted,	as	 it	did	 in	the	aftermath	of	
the	Orange	Revolution	in	2004.	
The	 post-Maidan	 oligarchic	 system	 is	 mainly	 characterised	 by	
a	 tactical	 alliance	 between	 the	major	 ‘old’	 oligarchs	 and	 either	
President	Poroshenko’s	camp	or	the	group	of	Arseniy	Yatsenyuk,	
i.e.	 the	 two	strongest	centres	of	political	power	 in	Ukraine.	The	
oligarchs	Dmytro	Firtash	and	Serhiy	Lyovochkin	are	among	those	
who	have	built	up	close	relations	with	the	president’s	circle,	while	
35	 Усі антикорупційні органи повинні нещадно боротися з політичною ко-
рупцією, - Арсеній Яценюк,	Km.gov.ua,	21	February	2016,	http://www.kmu.
gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=248845249&cat_id=244276429
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Ihor	 Kolomoyskyi	 and	 Rinat	 Akhmetov	 have	 associated	 them-
selves	with	Yatsenyuk’s	circle.	This	alliance	benefits	both	sides.	
The	 government	 officials	 have	 gained	 the	 support	 of	 important	
deputies	from	the	oligarchic	groupings	in	the	Verkhovna Rada,	as	
well	as	informal	sources	of	financing	and	media	support	(which	
was	particularly	important	in	view	of	the	parliamentary	and	local	
elections).	In	return,	the	oligarchs	were	granted	personal	safety,	
protection	for	their	businesses	and	the	ability	to	continue	lobby-
ing	for	their	business	interests.	Because	of	this	forced	symbiosis,	
the	new	leadership	of	Ukraine	has	chosen	not	to	revise	the	Yanuk-
ovych-era	privatisations,	of	which	the	oligarchic	groups	were	the	
main	beneficiaries.
As	 in	 the	 previous	 period,	 after	 the	 revolution	 the	 oligarchs	
again	 started	 exploiting	 their	 advantage	 over	 the	 politicians.	
In	 a	poorly	managed	 state	with	 an	 ineffective	 and	 corrupt	bu-
reaucracy,	 they	 are	 the	best-organised	group	 that	 is	 also	best-
prepared	to	govern.	They	can	afford	to	use	expensive	legal	coun-
sel	or	hire	 lobbyists,	and	they	have	at	their	disposal	their	own	
powerful	 television	stations	which	have	practically	dominated	
the	Ukrainian	media	market.	Yet	 in	order	 to	ensure	 that	 their	
businesses	are	protected,	the	oligarchic	groups	constantly	need	
to	use	tools	only	available	to	state	authorities,	which	means	that	
they	have	had	 to	find	 some	 common	ground	with	 the	political	
leadership.	It	should	be	noted	in	this	context	that	the	oligarchs	
do	not	have	any	constant	allies	among	the	political	parties,	but	
instead,	 enter	 temporary	deals	 that	are	 subject	 to	 revision	de-
pending	 on	what	 is	 needed	 to	 safeguard	 one’s	 interests	 at	 the	
given	moment.
As	a	 result	of	 the	 ‘old’	oligarchs	entering	alliances	with	 the	po-
litical	 camps	 of	 President	 Poroshenko	 and	 Arseniy	 Yatsenyuk	
&	 his	 People’s	 Front,	 a	 bipolar	 arrangement	 has	 formed	within	
the	oligarchic	system,	which	translates	directly	into	the	balance	
of	power	in	Ukrainian	politics.	Thus,	the	oligarchs’	co-operation	
with	the	government	has	led	to	the	formation	of	a	specific	type	of	
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pluralism.36	The	‘old’	oligarchs’	efforts	to	find	protection	for	their	
business	interests	also	contributed	to	this	outcome	–	the	co-oper-
ation	between	Rinat	Akhmetov	and	Arseniy	Yatsenyuk’s	circle	is	
a	case	in	point:	the	oligarch’s	interests	in	the	electricity	sector,	in	
which	he	had	been	the	dominant	actor	for	many	years,	had	come	
under	threat	as	a	result	of	the	expansion	of	people	with	links	to	
President	Poroshenko,	 i.e.	 Ihor	Kononenko	and	Konstantin	Gri-
gorishin,	who	were	seeking	to	gain	more	influence	in	that	sector.	
This	 bipolar	 arrangement	 survived	 the	 change	 of	 prime	minis-
ters	when	Arseniy	Yatsenyuk	stepped	down	and	was	replaced	by	
Volodymyr	Groysman,	 President	 Poroshenko’s	 trusted	man.	Af-
ter	lengthy	negotiations,	Yatsenyuk	was,	however,	able	to	resign	
on	 favourable	conditions	 for	his	party	and	 its	business	base.	As	
a	result,	the	balance	of	power	that	had	formed	over	the	last	two	
years	between	the	major	political	players	and	the	oligarchy	was	
preserved,	although	it	can	hardly	have	been	said	to	become	more	
stable.	There	is	nothing	to	suggest	that	Prime	Minister	Groysman	
will	be	willing	or	able	to	change	the	rules	according	to	which	the	
system	operates,	especially	since	the	new	coalition	only	has	a	thin	
majority	in	the	Verkhovna Rada,	and	in	many	votes	it	will	have	to	
look	for	additional	support	from	the	oligarchic	factions	–	and	pay	
the	price	for	doing	so.	Another	indication	that	the	status quo	be-
tween	the	government	and	the	oligarchs	will	continue	comes	from	
a	 statement	by	Groysman	who	said	 that	 “the	 same	rules	 should	
apply	 to	 the	 oligarchs	 (…),	 exclusively	market	mechanisms,	 no	
preferences	(…).	The	position	of	the	oligarchs	should	be	as	follows:	
let	them	take	care	of	the	country’s	economic	development	and	not	
interfere	in	[the	government’s]	affairs”.37	Such	an	approach	rules	
36	 To	some	extent	this	resembles	the	situation	after	2004,	when	some	of	the	
oligarchs	threw	their	weight	behind	Viktor	Yushchenko	and	others	backed	
Yulia	Tymoshenko,	but	at	that	time	there	also	existed	a	third	pole	–	the	camp	
of	Viktor	Yanukovych	and	the	oligarchs	around	him.
37	 Володимир Гройсман: Якщо прийдуть на обід Коломойський, Ахметов, 
Пінчук, Григоришин - тікати?,	pravda.com.ua,	16	May	2016,	http://www.
pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/05/16/7108560/
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out	any	radical	action	against	the	oligarchs,	although	it	does	dis-
play	an	intention	to	cautiously	and	slowly	‘civilise’	the	oligarchic	
system.	Given	the	current	political	context	in	Ukraine,	however,	
that	means	that	no	change	whatsoever	will	happen,	and	the	situa-
tion	which	emerged	after	the	Maidan	will	continue.	
The	processes	which	allowed	the	‘old’	oligarchic	groups	to	retain	
much	of	their	former	influence	and	the	rules	governing	Ukrain-
ian	politics	to	remain	unchanged	overlapped	with	the	emergence,	
in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Revolution	 of	 Dignity,	 of	 new	 political-
business	groups	around	the	two	major	centres	of	political	power	
in	Ukraine.	Since	2014,	people	from	these	groups	have	been	able	to	
take	operational	control	over	many	of	the	most	important	state-
owned	companies.	They	have	managed	to	gain	control	those	com-
panies’	financial	flows	while	de facto	assuming	no	responsibility	
for	 those	 companies’	 performance,	 and	 have	 been	 able	 to	 take	
convenient	starting	positions	ahead	of	the	planned	privatisations	
of	many	of	the	businesses	in	question,	thanks	to	their	control	of	
the	key	parliamentary	committees,	ministries	and	state	agencies.	
This	is	also	one	of	the	reasons	why	the	main	political	players	are	
currently	not	interested	in	early	parliamentary	elections.	For	the	
new	government	and	its	business	backers,	privatisation	offers	an	
opportunity	to	acquire	lucrative	business	assets	for	a	fraction	of	
their	real	value	because	the	economic	crisis	has	driven	the	pric-
es	down.	Moreover,	 they	are	in	a	position	to	manipulate	the	ac-
cess	of	potential	 rivals	 to	 the	privatisation	procedures.	And	be-
cause	there	are	few	not-yet-privatised	businesses	left	in	Ukraine,	
the	battle	over	who	will	acquire	them	is	now	entering	a	decisive	
phase,	which	will	inevitably	generate	conflicts.	The	business	base	
of	the	‘new’	oligarchs,	however,	is	considerably	weaker	than	that	
of	 the	 ‘old’	oligarchs.	The	 former	usually	do	not	own	any	major	
business	 assets,	 but	merely	manage	 state-owned	 property,	 and	
–	crucially	–	do	not	control	any	of	 the	major	 television	stations,	
which	are	an	important	political	instrument	in	Ukraine.	The	fact	
that	the	monopoly	of	the	traditional	players	in	the	media	market	
has	not	been	overcome	is	another	reason	why	the	‘new’	oligarchs	
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and	the	politicians	associated	with	them	have	had	to	reach	some	
kind	of	agreement	with	those	who	control	the	television	stations.
The	still	robust	oligarchic	system	and	the	Ukrainian	leadership’s	
inability	and	lack	of	political	will	to	really	challenge	it	have	been	
directly	affecting	the	reform	process	in	Ukraine.	After	the	Maid-
an,	Ukraine	 found	 itself	 in	a	paradoxical	 situation	–	on	 the	one	
hand,	members	of	the	new	government	are	fully	aware	that	they	
have	 to	reform	the	system	because	 that	 is	what	 the	people	 (and	
the	West)	expect,	and	is	objectively	necessary	in	view	of	the	fact	
that	the	post-Soviet	economic	and	political	model	has	exhausted	
its	potential.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	they	are	unable	to	con-
sistently	 pursue	 reforms	 because	 they	 themselves	 are	 products	
of	the	system.38	Most	of	the	leading	politicians	who	have	been	in	
power	in	Ukraine	since	2004	were	shaped	in	the	1990s	and	have	
already	held	high	state	offices	in	several	previous	governments.	It	
can	therefore	hardly	be	said	that	a	new	political	elite	has	come	to	
power	in	Ukraine	and,	as	a	result,	what	the	country	gets	is	adapta-
tion	and	adjustments	instead	of	earnest	attempts	at	structurally	
changing	the	situation.
The	fragmentary	reforms	carried	out	so	far	have	not	curbed	oli-
garchic	influence	to	any	significant	degree.	Even	the	positive	so-
lutions	adopted	by	the	Verkhovna Rada,	which	should	have	under-
mined	 the	oligarchs’	 clout,	have	been	watered	down	or	delayed	
(for	 example,	 there	 have	 been	 attempts	 at	 delaying	 the	 start	 of	
the	anti-corruption	institutions’	operations,	and	the	introduction	
of	public	financing	of	political	parties	has	been	postponed	until	
2017).	Thanks	 to	 the	President’s	 control	 of	 the	General	Prosecu-
tor’s	Office,	it	has	been	possible	to	effectively	thwart	some	incon-
venient	investigations.	Neither	has	any	substantial	deregulation	
of	 the	economy	taken	place,	which	could	have	created	 the	right	
38	 M.	Seddom,	Washington’s	Man	In	Ukraine	Can’t	Stop	His	Country’s	Cor-
rupt  Cronies,	 BuzzNews,	 21	 October	 2015,	 https://www.buzzfeed.com/
maxseddon/washingtons-man-in-ukraine-cant-stop-his-countrys-corrupt-
cr?utm_term=.oxMXzvm40#.maQrmG1Ao
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conditions	 for	 the	development	of	 small-	and	medium-sized	en-
terprises	and	undermined	 the	preferential	 conditions	on	which	
the	oligarchic	businesses	operate.	The	experience	of	the	last	doz-
en	or	so	years	proves	that	the	oligarchic	economic	model	cannot	
provide	a	viable	alternative	to	an	effectively	functioning	market	
because	it	cannot	create	stable	sources	of	growth.	On	the	contra-
ry,	 the	oligarchs,	who	have	 taken	over	entire	 economic	 sectors,	
have	been	mainly	interested	in	maximising	their	profits	and	have	
cared	 little	 about	 the	 development	 and	 modernisation	 of	 their	
businesses.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 extensive	 and	 anti-development	
economic	model,	 none	 of	 the	 big	 business-dominated	 sectors	 of	
the	Ukrainian	economy	has	undergone	any	modernisation.
More	than	two	years	after	the	Maidan,	the	new	government	has	
yet	to	deliver	on	one	of	its	key	promises	–	to	strip	the	oligarchic	
groups	of	 influence	as	part	of	 a	deep	 reform	process.	While	 the	
highest-ranking	members	of	the	Ukrainian	leadership	regularly	
re-assert	their	commitment	to	de-oligarchisation	in	their	policy	
statements,	little	is	being	done	to	actually	achieve	that	goal.	Given	
the	scale	of	their	observable	lack	of	political	will	to	do	anything	
to	that	end,	one	should	presume	that	the	oligarchs	will	keep	their	
influence	 as	 long	as	 the	 current	balance	of	power	 in	Ukrainian	
politics	prevails.	Some	more	or	less	serious	conflicts	may	emerge	
between	 the	government	and	 individual	oligarchs,	but	 this	will	
not	affect	the	system	in	any	significant	way.39	Moreover,	even	if	
a	 snap	election	were	 to	be	held	 in	 the	coming	months,	 it	would	
be	very	unlikely	to	lead	to	a	qualitative	change	in	the	Verkhovna 
Rada	 and	 elevate	 parties	 free	 of	 oligarchic	 influences	 to	 power.	
That	is	because,	faced	with	costly	election	campaigning,	each	of	
the	major	political	parties	would	need	to	reach	for	the	financial	
39	 Ihor	Kolomoyskyi	was	therefore	right	to	say	that	in	the	present	conditions,	
“Ukrainian	de-oligarchisation	meant	taking	business	assets	away	from	some	
oligarchs	and	giving	them	to	other	oligarchs”. Игорь Коломойский: «Я не го-
тов к тому, чтобы мне сказали правила и я стал по ним жить, а Кононенко 
- нет»,	LB.ua,	3	December	2015,	http://lb.ua/news/2015/12/03/322600_igor_
kolomoyskiy_ya_gotov_tomu.html
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
8/
20
16
41
and	media	 support	 of	 the	 oligarchic	 groups,	 and	would	have	 to	
put	 the	 oligarchs’	 representatives	 in	 its	 election	 lists	 in	 return.	
In	view	of	the	general	weakness	of	the	state	and	the	other,	previ-
ously	described	 instruments	of	oligarchic	 influence,	 this	means	
that	in	the	foreseeable	future,	the	oligarchs	will	continue	to	act	as	
important	‘stakeholders’	in	Ukrainian	politics,	in	which	they	hold	
a	blocking	package.
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